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Abstract: Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have many potential applications. In many scenarios WSNs are
of interest to adversaries and they become susceptible to some types of attacks since they are deployed in open
environments and have limited resources. Many attacks are known against WSNs. Protections exist against
some of them but for the others IDS (Intrusion Detection Mechanism) systems are required. In this report, we
present a new WSN attacks ontology that enable us to identify the intention of the attacker, his capabilities
to achieve the attacks, the target and the end result. This ontology is a high level abstraction that does not
depend on the IDS system used. We also survey known vulnerabilities and attacks in WSNs and present some
defenses.
Key-words: attacks, wireless sensor networks, ontology
Une ontologie des attaques dans les réseaux de capteurs sans l
Résumé : Les réseaux de capteurs sans l ont beaucoup d'applications potentielles. Dans beaucoup de
scénarios, ces réseaux sont sujets à de nombreuses attaques en raison du déploiement en environnement ouvert
et de leurs ressources limitées. Des mécanismes de protection existent contre quelques unes d'entre elles mais il
est souvent nécessaire d'ajouter à ces systèmes des mécanismes de détection d'intrusion. Dans ce rapport, nous
présentons une nouvelle ontologie d'attaques dans ces réseaux an d'identier l'intention de l'attaquant, ses
capacités à réussir les attaques, la cible et le résultat nal. Cette ontologie est une abstraction de haut niveau
qui ne dépend pas du système d'intrusion utilisé. Nous décrivons également ici les vulnérabilités connues dans
les réseaux de capteurs sans l et nous présentons également un certain nombre de contre-mesures.
Mots-clés : attaques, réseaux de capteurs sans ls, ontologie
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1 Introduction
Advances in wireless communications have enabled the development of low-cost and low-power wireless sensor
networks (WSNs). The characteristics of such WSNs are namely minimal energy, weak computational capabili-
ties, wireless communication and an open-environment nature where sensors are deployed. Due to the intrinsic
nature of those networks, WSNs are vulnerable to many attacks. Some of those attacks can be discarded by
preventive mechanisms but IDS schemes are required to prevent the others. In this paper, we present a new
ontology to categorize attacks in WSNs. This high level ontology does not depend on the IDS system used,
it highlights the link between some actions done in the network and the possible attacks coming from those
observed facts. Moreover, we outline the known attacks on WSNs and relative solutions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we dene a new ontology attacks in order to better
classify attacks on sensor networks. In section 3 we focus on attacks and vulnerabilities along with possible
defenses and we show how we can apply the ontology to such attacks.
2 Attacks Ontology
Several attack classications have been proposed in the literature. The main approaches used to describe and
classify attacks are: taxonomies and ontologies. A taxonomy allows us to reason about attacks at a higher
level than a simple list of vulnerabilities and so provides a system classication that helps designer to minimize
attacks. A good taxonomy [1] must have the following characteristics: accepted, unambiguous, comprehensible,
determinist, mutually exclusive and exhaustive. [19, 8, 14, 22] propose dierent taxonomies to classify attacks.
Then ontologies were proposed to limit the ineciency and the inexpressiveness of attack taxonomies. An
ontology is a structured system of concepts which covers a specic eld and presents the reality in a form of a
model.
2.1 Ontology for Wireless Sensor Network
Here we present our ontology to classify WSN's attacks which was inspired from work in [6]. In their work, the
authors dene a new alerts ontology with abstraction of detectors which means they propose a new model of
the detectors without consider any specic IDS (Intrusion Detection System). This abstraction is done using
the theory of action in philosophy which roughly says that an action is composed of an intention, a movement
and an object. So, we propose to implement these concept for WSN. Using this approach, our attack ontology
(shown in Figure 1-a) is composed by four main classes, intention, movement, target and result. In our ontology,
we do not take into account the nature of the attacker (if it was a raider, a hacker, a vandal, etc) because we
assume that once the malicious node is introduced in the network, it is very dicult to dene his nature and
to distinguish it with a legitimate node.
2.1.1 Intention
Each attack in the network has a plan of action. This plan can be composed by one or many steps which
correspond to the achievement of a goal (the goal can also be viewed as the sum of multiple sub-goals). As
we want to identify the intention of an attacker, we must rst study his attack strategy. This plan can be
organised in three phases: information gathering, exploits and contamination.The information gathering consists
in determination of characteristics and weaknesses of the WSN as the topology discovery, location of the sink,
trac analysis, etc. Once information collected, the attacker try to nd vulnerabilities that can be exploitable
(exploits) as determination of the master/private key, alteration of data packets, etc, and nally once the attack
is set up, the contamination phase presents the inuence on the other parts of the network. Using this study,
we now dene ve dierent intentions for an attack in a WSN :
 Passive eavesdrop, which consists in information gathering on specic or multiple targets.
 Disrupt communication, which consists in preventing data from reaching their destinations and destroying
links between nodes.
 Unfairness, which ensures the exhausting of available resources like bandwidth, energy, battery, etc.
 To be authenticated, which means obtaining a right access to the network services.
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(a) The ontology attacks.
(b) The ontology viewed as a taxonomy.
Figure 1: Ontology attack.
 To be authorized, which means having the ability to grant appropriate access to ressources, for example
obtain keys to decrypt messages.
2.1.2 Movement
The movement describes the way the attacker reaches one/many intentions presented above. We identify four
dierent categories that describe the movements in a wireless sensor networks:
 Technical capabilities, which means the extra technologies available with the malicious entity : for example
an attacker may have a sophisticated wireless radio to receive and transmit over multiple channels. It may
have also more eciency hardware component, higher bandwidth links and better batteries. The attacker
can also use a laptop to apply ecient tamper techniques to extract data from nodes.
 Contributors, which specify if the attack is realized by one or many adversaries. How do these attackers
cooperate together to success the attack ? Are they autonomous or centrally controlled ? Is the attacker
a sample sensor node or a sophisticated device ? A laptop for example ? All this characteristics dier
from one attacker to another.
 Vulnerabilities, which are the weaknesses present in the network due for example to resources constraints
or wicked design.Vulnerabilities can be physical - for example a tamper attack is very easy to launch as
the nodes are deployed in open environment - or logical - designing and implementing vulnerabilities such
as buer overows, bad congurations or resources exhaustions.
 Layer, here we precise which network layer the attack uses to success its intention. The network layers
are physical, link, routing and application.
INRIA
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2.1.3 Target
In a WSN, all system resources and network services are targets for the attackers. Targets can be physical, for
example destroy the sensor, damage the radio, remove the batteries, etc. Targets can be logical : internal or
provided services. An attack against an internal service has the goal to damage an intern service of the sensor
node, for example the power management, connection between layers, etc. However provided service concern
services available in the network such as time synchronization, key management, clustering protocols, etc.
2.1.4 Result
An attack is considered successful if the global goal is achieved. But sometimes, the attack can be partially
achieved and not completed. So we can dene three categories to describe the result:
 If the attack was stopped by a preventative mechanism, we can say that we have a passive damage. So
the service oered by the WSN is not damaged.
 If the service is absent in one part of the network (for example in one cluster region), here the attacker
maybe has partial degradation of the WSN duty.
 the most serious problem is when the service is broken for the entire network.
Figure 1-b summarises our ontology presented as a taxonomy for simplication reasons.
3 Attacks on WSNs and defenses
In the following section, we describe some attacks of WSNs and possible defenses. Attacks described below are
classied using network layers for only simplication reasons. We will also show how we can apply our ontology
described in section 2 to classify those attacks examples.
3.1 Attacks on physical layer
3.1.1 Jamming
In a jamming attack, the adversary tries to transmit signals to the receiving antenna at the same frequency
band or sub-band as the transmitter uses, thus causing radio interference. This attack is mostly used by a
laptop, which holds higher energy, to disrupt continuously the network. It can also be done with a simple
node causing a partial damage which can be also fatal to the WSN (for example random distributed jammed
node). In [29] authors present dierent jamming strategies: constant jamming by emitting continuously a radio
signal, deceptive jamming by injecting regular packets to the channel without any gap between packets, random
jamming where the attacker alternates between sleeping and jamming to save power consumption and reactive
jamming which will transmit only when it senses channel activity and will stay quiet when the channel is idle
[17]. Many solutions have been proposed to defend against these jamming attacks. Typical defenses involve
variations of spread-spectrum communication such as frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS), that consists
in sending data by switching rapidly a carrier sense among many frequency channels, or code spreading. The
FHSS techniques are only used in military applications due to the complexity and to the cost, for example
the MICA 2 mote is the only known sensor which switches eciently between two frequency and every extra
frequency will need extra processing. [29] proposes others solutions against jamming attacks. Nodes can also
try to map out the jammed area by isolating the infected region. Such a protocol was presented in [28]. Another
option is to use channel surng method which is motivated by frequency hopping modulation. The dierence
with FHSS is that channel surng does not involve a continual change of the carrier sense and it operates at the
link layer. According to the ontology, the intention of the jamming attack is to disrupt communication. The
movement is a sophisticated radio as technical capability, one/many node or a laptop as contributors, wireless
communication and known channel as vulnerabilities and it uses the physical layer. The target will be the
communication services and the result is partial/entire degradation of the services in the network.
3.1.2 Tampering
Another possible attack is tampering which involves physical access and capture of nodes. The adversary can
gain full control of these motes and try to extract sensitive information such as secret key shared between
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nodes. The tampering attacks can be classied into two classes: invasive attacks, which require access to the
hardware components like chips and which need high-tech and expensive equipment used in semiconductor
manufacturing, and non-invasive which are easiest than invasive and require less times. In [4], the authors had
tried some of those attacks on Telos and Mica2 motes. We can mention attack via JTAC1 such as testing access
port (TAP) which can enable an adversary to take complete control over the sensor node. Other attacks consist
on exploiting the Bootstrap Loader (BSL) which enables writing and reading on the micro controller's memory.
The adversary can also attack the external ash or EEPROM where sometimes valuable data are stored. A
simple way to realize this attack is to eavesdrop on the conductor wires connecting the external memory chip
with the micro controller. Another form of tampering attack can consist in replacing or injecting sensor nodes.
In [5] the authors present new key management protocol that detect the injection of malicious nodes in the
network. There is not a global solution against all these attacks. Standard precautions can be applied like
disabled the JTAG interface or the use a good password for the bootstrap loader. Using the ontology, the
intention of the tampering attack is to be authenticated and to be authorized in the network. The movement
will be, as explained above high-tech material as technical capabilities to extract information, the contributors
are generally laptops, the vulnerabilities are the non protected hardware component of sensors and the open
environment where the nodes are deployed. Then the target is the hardware component of node, for example
the EEPROM or the BSL. The layer used here is the same as the jamming attack, the physical layer. Finally,
the result is, in this case, the entire damage of service in the network.
3.2 Attacks on Link layer
3.2.1 Collisions
In the collision attack, the adversary sends his own signal when he hears that a legitimate node will transmit
a message in order to make interferences. In theory, causing collisions in only one byte is enough to create a
CRC error and to cripple the message. The advantages of a collision attack compared to a jamming attack
is the short power energy consumed and the diculty to detect it (the only evidence of collisions attacks is
incorrect message). In fact, such an attack can target specially the ACK control message causing an exponential
back-o in some MAC protocol. All countermeasures that can be used against jamming attacks can be applied
to collision attacks. Another solution is to use Error correcting codes [20] which are ecient in situation where
errors occur on a limited number of bytes but this solution presents also an expensive communication overheard
and additional processings. According to the ontology, rst the intention of the collision attack is to exhaust the
battery by using the channel of communication indenitely. Then in the movement class, the attacker does not
really need particular technical capabilities and it can be launched by anyone in the network, the vulnerability
is the data integrity requirement and the layer used is the link layer. The target is general logical and can be at
the same time against internal service like power management and against provided services, for example the
communication service. Finally the result can be partial degradation if the attack is launched in certain region
in the network or total degradation if the attack is applied in multiple precise locations in the network.
3.2.2 Exhaustion
Exhaustion attacks [16] consist in introducing collisions in frames towards the end of transmission and force the
sensor node to retransmit continuously the packets until his death. This attack can be launched using a laptop
or an ordinary sensor node. One way to defend against this attack is to limit the MAC admission control rate
and so the sensor network can ignore excessive requests from the adversary and prevent energy loss. Another
solution is to allow for each sensor node a small slot of time to access to the channel and transmit data, so it
limits the possibility of long use of the MAC channel. The exhaustion attack present the same characteristics
according to the ontology than the collision attack. The only dierence is the vulnerability used where the
exhaustion attack exploits the checksum fault of the transmitted message.
3.2.3 Link layer Jamming
In [17], the authors present a link-layer jamming attack. They mentioned that those jamming attacks are as
eective as constant/deceptive/reactive jamming (explained in the jamming attack) and at the same time more
1JTAG is an IEEE 1149.1 standard designed to assist electronics engineers in testing their equipment during the development
phase. Among other things, it can be used in current equipment for on-chip debugging, including single stepping through code,
and for reading and writing memory. Many sensor nodes, as MICA2, Telos, ESB, have a JTAG connector on their circuit board
allowing easy access to the micro controllers Test Access Port (TAP).
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 2: Attacks on WSN.
energy-ecient than random or reactive jamming. The native idea is to nd data packet and to jam it. But
as they are generated spontaneously, it is very dicult to predict when data packets will arrive and then apply
the attack. The solution proposed is to look at the probability distribution of the interarrival times between
all types of packets. This attack was applied on three MAC protocols: S-MAC, B-MAC and L-MAC. The
S-MAC probability distribution of packet interarrival times presents two separated clusters (denoted cluster1
and cluster2). This clear separation still stands even if we use mobile nodes or dierent data packet lengths.
The attack exploits this particular phenomena. In fact if we have, for every cluster2 interarrival time, c cluster1
interarrival times, then right after observing a cluster2 interarrival time, we should expect c cluster1 interarrival
times. So here the jamming attack becomes possible if we have an exact prediction model of packets arrival.
The same idea could be applied to L-MAC protocol but the technique diers as it presents dierent probability
distributions of packets interarrival times. Concerning B-MAC protocol, it is not possible to use the clusters
idea as B-MAC use a periodic cycles only for listening and not for sending. The attack proposed in [17] against
B-MAC rst nds out the preamble check interval that the victim nodes are using and so has the possibility
to launch jamming attacks. Moreover, the attack can take advantage of periodic listening to save energy. To
prevent networks from this link layer jamming attack, some countermeasures are given. For S-MAC, the solution
is to prevent clustering based analysis from being feasible. This can be done by narrowing the distance between
the two clusters. In the case of L-MAC, a partial solution is to make the estimation of the clusters more dicult
by changing the slot sizes (used for packet transmission) pseudorandomly as a function of time. For example a
sensor node changes its packet slot size every second by picking a random value from a range. For the B-MAC,
the only solution is to shorten the preamble in order to make its detection harder (the minimum value known
is 10 ms). This link layer jamming attack was also studied on others slot-based MAC protocols (T-MAC [25],
D-MAC [21]), frame-based protocols (PACT, Arisha [2], BMA [18], etc) and random access-based protocols
(PCM [15], WiseMAC [10], etc). Using the ontology, here the intention is to disrupt communication. Moreover,
it needs a very sophisticated radio to analyse the trac and can be launched by one/many nodes or a laptop
device. This attack exploits the propriety of data packets interarrival time at link layer level. The target of such
attack is the communication services and the result is (like in the above attacks) a partial or total degradation
of services in the network (depending on the region where the attacks is launched).
3.3 Attacks on Routing layer
3.3.1 Selective forwarding
In a selective forwarding attack [16], the malicious node forwards most messages and selectively drops, which
means throwing away some of the data. One example of such attack is the black hole attack where the attacker
chooses to drop all messages. The more the malicious node is closer to the base station, the more the attack is
ecient (more trac will pass through it). One way to mitigate this type of attack is to use multipath routing
[11] in combination with random selection of paths to destination. These defenses lessen the probability that
a message will encounter an adversary along all routes. Another solution is to use monitor nodes that ensure
that their neighbors forward the messages. The use of watchdog can help this supervision. The intention of
this attack is to alter data and loses a part of information (so it is a part of the unfairness category). Here the
attack does not require any technical capabilities and can be executed by every node that participates in the
routing mechanism. The vulnerability is that the message is not encrypted and anyone can read information in
the packets. So it's clear that it use the routing layer. The target is generally the sink but can also be a sample
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destination node. The result will be a total broken of all service oered by the network (for example wrong
environmental alert) if we assume that all packets are altered.
3.3.2 Sinkhole
In the sinkhole attack [16], the malicious node tries to draw in all possible trac. This is done by making the
attacker very attractive to the surrounding nodes with respect to the routing metric (example higher power
transmission). Then the surrounding nodes will choose the sinkhole node to route their data. For example, the
Figure 2d shows the malicious node (black node) reacts like a sink and attracts all the trac. One approach to
avoid sinkholes is to use routing protocols [16] that verify the bidirectional reliability of a route with end-to-end
acknowledgements which contain latency and quality information. The sinkhole attack's intention is to create
a false sink and then create a false topology. It uses higher ressources to convince other nodes of its superiority.
It is launched generally by a laptop or a PDA and it exploits the non authentication of links and identities. It
is done at the routing layer level. The targets are all services provided by the network and the result is that
information does not reach the base station, so it is a partial/total damage of the WSNs.
3.3.3 Sybil
In a Sybil attack [23] the malicious node assumes multiple identities. The goal is to ll a neighbouring node's
memory with useless from non existing neighbours. For example, as some routing protocols use redundancy
detection to eliminate sensor nodes, if a Sybil node assumes the identities of ten nodes, it can remove all this
real neighbour nodes from neighbour tables of all nodes within its radio range. It can even remove the sink if
the attacker presents a higher transmission's quality. In Figure 2b the malicious node forges and broadcasts the
identities of nodes A, B, C and D for all its neighbors. As the identity fraud is the core of the Sybil attack,
authentication is the key prevention against this attack, for example the SPIN algorithm [24] can be used.
[9] shows that without a centralized authority, a Sybil attack is always possible. According to the ontology,
the intention of the Sybil attack is included in the unfairness category by forging the identities of many nodes
and so create information redundancy. This attack does not need any special technical capability and can be
launched by one node or a laptop device. It uses the routing layer and exploits the non-authentication of node's
identities. The target of such attack is always the provided services like data aggregation, voting, etc. The
result of such attack can be partial or entire degradation of the network's service, depending on the location of
the launch of the attack.
3.3.4 Hello ood
Many routing algorithms use hello packets to discover routes. In the hello ood attack [16], the attacker tries
to convince all nodes to choose it as a parent using a powerful radio transmitter to bomb whole network with
hello message announcing false neighbor status. So legitimate nodes will attempt transmission to the attacking
node, despite many are out of range. If the attacker has the same reception capabilities, one way to avoid the
hello ood attacks is to verify the bi-directionality of local links [16]. If not, authentication is a solution for
nodes to verify the identity of theirs neighbors. Here, according to the ontology, the hello ood attack presents
the same characteristics as the Sybil attack, but this attack needs a sophisticated radio to better diuse the
hello packets in the whole network.
3.3.5 Routing cycles
This attack [16] consists in making a path cycle between the source and the destination node. So the data
message will go around in circles (gure 2c), possibly forever. This attack is simple to detect even by using
tree-path routing protocols or using a hop count limit for forwarded packets. This attack presents also the same
characteristics as the sinkhole attack but here the attack needs more than one attacker to create loops in the
routing mechanism.
3.3.6 Wormhole
A wormhole attack [16] is a low-latency link between two nodes in the network which can be exploited by an
attacker to apply other kind of attacks. This attack can be launched using an out-of-band or high-bandwidth
channel between two malicious nodes, for example a direct wired link or a long-range directional wireless link.
Figure 2a shows a situation where a wormhole attack takes place. We can also apply this type of attacks using
INRIA
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a singular malicious node where the attacker relays packets between two distant legitimate nodes to convince
them that they are neighbors. Many defenses are given to prevent the wormhole attack as the use of packet
leaches [13], MAD protocol [7], directional antennas [12], multi-dimensional scaling algorithm [26] and the use of
Local Neighborhood Information [30]. Here the intention of the wormhole attack can be a passive eavesdrop of
data, false topology creation or to be authenticated. It requires a very sophisticated radio or a cable to establish
the long channel communication. It can be launched by at least two nodes or laptops at the routing layer. The
targets are logical and the wormhole attack attempts to damage all services available in the network. the result
is the same as the sinkhole attack.
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3.4 Attacks on Application layer
3.4.1 Flooding
In this attack [27], the adversary tries to exhaust the memory and energy of a sensor node, which needs to
maintain states at either end of connection, through ooding. The adversary will send successively requests to
establish connection with a node until its death. This attack is similar to the TCP SYN attack where a node
opens a large number of connections with another node to exhaust its resources. This attack can be realized
with a simple sensor node or a laptop. The proposed solution to resist to this attack is the use of client puzzle.
A connection will be only accepted after resolving a puzzle proposed by a server [3]. In general, puzzles are
computationally expensive and hence serve as a deterrent to limit the rate request of the attacker. According
the our ontology, the intention of such attack is to exhaust the limited ressources of nodes. It does not need
any special materials but it needs a good battery. It can be launched by one/many nodes or a laptop and uses
the application layers. The vulnerabilities used here is that there is no constraint on using network ressources
or the authorization on modifying data packets. The target is the internal services of nodes such processing
cycles and the result can be partial or total damages depends on the location of the attacks in the network.
3.4.2 Desynchronisation
This attack [27] consists on disrupting the existing connections among two nodes by resynchronizing their
transmission. One way to apply this attack is to send repeatedly forged messages to the two nodes of the
communicating parties with various fault ags like sequence and so to oblige them to go out of synchronisation.
A simple defense consists in using an authentication mechanism to control the identity and the integrity of
packets. The intention of such attack is to disrupt communication established between two legitimates nodes.
It does not require special technical capabilities and also uses the application layer. The vulnerability that is
exploited here is that sometimes we needs a radio synchronisation to communicate in the network. The target
is internal services which are the requirement of synchronization in the appropriate layer. Finally the result
consist in, as the ooding attack, a partial or total broken of network's services.
4 Conclusion
The paper presents a representative list of possible attacks and the associated defenses in a WSNs using a new
ontology denition, summarized in table 1. We are now working on implementing this ontology, to enable an
easier detection of such attacks in real cases if it is associated with an IDS system. The next step of our work
is to validate the ontology by simulations and experiments on WSN.
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